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TOWARD PROPORTIONAL DEPORTATION
Polly J. Price∗
ABSTRACT
Professor Price discusses how Professor Banks’s contribution provides an
especially compelling illustration of the disjuncture between citizenship status
and long-term residence in U.S. immigration law. Professor Price argues that
Professor Banks makes a compelling case that Congress unintentionally
created this schism and that this state of affairs need not be.
INTRODUCTION
With comprehensive immigration reform at a critical juncture in the United
States, Angela Banks’s timely article reminds us of an important part of that
debate—the deportation of noncitizens with long-term, significant ties to this
country.1 Specifically, Banks addresses deportation on “aggravated felony”
grounds as an overinclusive net for the public policy it was intended to serve.2
In doing so, she has identified one of the most important and contentious issues
in deportation policy today.
The larger principle at issue—that citizenship is an inadequate proxy for
membership interests in U.S. society—is well-traveled ground. Recent
literature on this theme, much of which she cites, can be found in the
scholarship of law professors Daniel Kanstroom,3 Hiroshi Motomura,4 and
Linda Bosniak,5 as well as in the scholarship of history and political science

∗ Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law; Associated Faculty, Department of History,
Emory University.
1 See Angela M. Banks, The Normative and Historical Cases for Proportional Deportation, 62 EMORY
L.J. 1243 (2013).
2 See id. at 1248‒50, 1287‒88.
3 See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 243 (2007).
4 See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 195‒97 (2006).
5 See LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 3
(2006).
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professors Linda Kerber6 and Ayelet Schachar.7 The debate over birthright
citizenship in the United States is premised upon the “arbitrary” nature of
ascriptive rules: should full membership rights be based solely on the ground
of territorial birth? And the concept of jus nexi has been well-developed both
in U.S. and international scholarship.8 The notion that ties to the United
States—and not formal citizenship—has been recognized in some contexts by
the U.S. Supreme Court.9
Banks’s contribution, however, provides an especially compelling
illustration of the disjuncture between citizenship status and long-term
residence in U.S. immigration law. Banks elucidates the expansion of crimes
encompassed by the federal aggravated felony deportation ground, as well as
the removal of discretion at nearly all levels of the deportation process.10
Banks acknowledges the administrative concerns favoring a speedy,
predictable response to violent crimes committed by recent arrivals,
particularly those who entered the country surreptitiously. But “green card”
holders and long-term residents, she argues, deserve better. This is especially
true for any noncitizen with significant community ties. Families are left
destitute and U.S. citizen children lose critical parental support, often for a
one-off, nonviolent crime committed and punished years ago.
This state of affairs need not be, and Banks makes a compelling case that
Congress unintentionally created it. Banks’s exploration of the legislative
history of deportation on criminal grounds is an impressive contribution: we
see that the United States has followed different policies in the past, with
arguably more success as a deterrent to crime, and certainly with more
fairness. We also see that Congress’s 1996 foray into deportation strategy—
and particularly, the aggravated felony expansions—exhibited substantial
confusion about the effect on green card holders and other long-term

6 See generally, e.g., Linda K. Kerber, Presidential Address, The Stateless as the Citizen’s Other: A
View from the United States, 112 AM. HIST. REV. 1 (2007) (examining the interplay between statelessness and
citizenship).
7 See generally AYELET SCHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY
112 (2009) (arguing that the basis for citizenship is neither birth in a particular territory nor “descent from a
member parent,” but, instead, “stems from being a participant in the relevant bounded membership
community”).
8 See id. at 16. See generally RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY: STUDIES IN COSMOPOLITAN
DEMOCRACY (Daniele Archibugi et al. eds., 1998) (collecting essays on national sovereignty, concepts of
membership, and the response of political institutions to globalization).
9 See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).
10 See Banks, supra note 1, at 1251, 1281‒82, 1287.
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residents.11 Subsequent efforts to ameliorate this effect have gained no traction,
Banks notes, because legislators generally fear the “soft on crime” label. It is
always difficult to roll back criminal sanctions, especially in the midst of a
highly charged debate over illegal immigration.
Banks’s article is thought provoking and leads to further questions and
challenges for U.S. immigration policy. I would like to raise three such
questions, in abbreviated form. I do not provide answers because the issues I
identify are sufficiently complex to warrant separate analysis. Nonetheless, I
believe these questions both highlight the important contributions of Banks’s
article and underscore its further implications.
I. WHAT ARE THE BEST STRATEGIES TO FIX THE PROBLEM?
Banks advocates a statutory approach that would provide concrete criteria
to determine which noncitizens should be allowed to stay when facing
deportation for a post-entry crime. She admits that this approach would require
“complex” rules enacted by Congress, not formulated in her article.12
Distributional fairness may require such categorical complexity if a
discretionary approach—standards rather than rules—permits unacceptable
variation in deportation decisions. But perhaps other strategies might further
her goal? Prosecutorial discretion in selecting whom to deport gets little
attention in the article, but rules directing prosecutors to account for residential
ties could perhaps provide the outcome Banks seeks without requiring
Congress to act. This approach, of course, depends upon the will of the
Executive, and would likely be viewed by some members of Congress as
unacceptable executive action (similar to the reaction of some members of
Congress to President Obama’s implementation of deferred action for
childhood arrivals as a matter of prosecutorial discretion).
Another approach might be to restore the discretion formerly held by
immigration law judges, if not the federal judiciary. Banks cites the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines as a model for the complex rules to be enshrined by
statute, but the Guidelines, too, have long been criticized for one-size-fits-all

11

In 1996, Congress enacted both the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (frequently referred to as IIRIRA). See
Banks, supra note 1, at 1279.
12 Banks states, “Complex rule-like directives could be used to achieve this goal. Congress could create a
system like the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that takes account of a variety of factors in determining an
individual’s punishment.” Banks, supra note 1, at 1303.
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punishment, when in some circumstances judges see the need for an
individualized approach.13 The Guidelines have eroded in favor of greater
judicial control over individualized sentencing. It might be possible to tap into
this more general devolution for criminal sentencing as an argument equally
applicable to deportation proceedings.
Finally, are there any significant prospects for a successful constitutional
challenge to automatic deportation for an aggravated felony? It is true, as
Banks notes, that the long-standing “deportation is not punishment” refrain is
still the reigning paradigm. On the other hand, some judges and even the
Supreme Court have recently expressed discomfort with this nineteenthcentury declaration.14 Banks’s hypothetical case of “Gerardo,” reflected in
many real-life instances, might present a compelling opportunity to rid the law
of this categorical distinction.
II. SHOULD WE CONSIDER DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF U.S. DEPORTATION
DECISIONS ON OTHER NATIONS?
Some nations on the receiving end of U.S. deportations, primarily in
Central America, maintain that U.S. deportation practices have led to
substantial increase in drug- and gang-related violent crime in their countries.15
There is ample reason to believe this is true.16 But should this be a
consideration for the U.S. government? After all, dangerous criminals make
the paradigm case for aggravated felony exclusions. We make our country
safer when we expel such persons.
The end game of deportation is to expel a person to his or her country of
origin.17 For the receiving nation, this outcome is arbitrary if the deportee has
little or no connection to the country of his or her nationality. On the other
13

See id. at n.350.
See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010); H. Lee Sarokin, Debunking the Myth That
Deportation Is Not Punishment, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Oct. 14, 2009, 4:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/judge-h-lee-sarokin/debunking-the-myth-that-d_b_321329.html.
15 See Steven Dudley, Part II: Gangs, Deportation, and Violence in Central America,
INSIGHTCRIME.ORG (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.insightcrime.org/violence-against-migrants/part-ii-gangsdeportation-and-violence-in-central-america.
16 See MICHAEL SHIFTER, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, COUNTERING CRIMINAL VIOLENCE IN
CENTRAL AMERICA, at vii, 7, 9, 21–22, 29 (2012), http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Criminal_
Violence_CSR643.pdf.
17 In some instances, deportation cannot occur because nationality cannot be determined or no country is
willing to receive the deportee. Polly J. Price, Stateless in the United States: Current Reality and a Future
Prediction, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 443, 472 (2013).
14
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hand, the return of an adult criminal who only recently left that country can be
more easily justified. Long-term U.S. residents deported on aggravated felony
grounds arguably developed a propensity for violence or drug use in this
country. Rather than punish and reform these individuals, the United States
prefers to export its own crime problem. Citizenship and nationality, absent the
jus nexi principle advocated by Banks, is underinclusive in this way as well.
A related question follows from the banishment of violent criminals to a
country with which they have no ties. State governments object to the expense
of imprisoning noncitizens, particularly those with no legal permission to be in
the United States. From this perspective, state and local governments prefer
immediate deportation after a conviction, thus avoiding the significant cost of
incarceration. But this also substitutes society’s traditional “punishment” for
the crime in favor of the “punishment” of deportation. If this result applied
only to noncitizens with no substantial ties here, would that be an acceptable
trade-off for implementing the rules Banks advocates? Crime victims might
disagree, especially if the deportee finds an illicit way back.
III. IF THE UNITED STATES EASES ITS “WAR ON DRUGS,” SHOULDN’T THAT BE
REFLECTED IN IMMIGRATION LAW?
Finally, Banks’s article invites broader reflection on America’s “war on
drugs.” It is no coincidence that Congress imposed near-automatic deportation
for drug crimes in the same era that it created inflexible and harsh federal
sentences—including the death penalty—for certain drug crimes.18 The U.S.
prison population is notoriously large, and a high proportion of inmates are
there because of drug crimes.19 Drug crimes, in turn, have been the centerpiece
for deportation on aggravated felony grounds.
Recently, however, politicians readily admit that there are disparities and
other problems with harsh sentencing for drug crimes, and, in some instances.
they have attempted to ameliorate these problems. The Fair Sentencing Act of
2010, for example, reduced the disparity in sentencing between crack and
powder cocaine.20 A recent CNN report labeled the war on drugs “a trillion-

18

The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, for example, included the death
penalty for large-scale drug trafficking. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994, NCJRS.GOV (Oct. 24, 1994), https://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/billfs.txt.
19 See Adam Liptak, U.S. Prison Population Dwarfs That of Other Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/world/americas/23iht-23prison.12253738.html?pagewanted=all.
20 Fair Sentencing Act, ACLU.ORG, https://www.aclu.org/fair-sentencing-act (last visited May 15, 2014).
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dollar failure.”21 The governors of Georgia22 and New Jersey,23 among other
states, have expressed the desire to lessen the prison sentence for those
convicted of what are increasingly viewed to be minor drug offenses. The
potential legalization of marijuana use would also contrast sharply with
marijuana-related deportations.
Will different priorities in the war on drugs also be reflected in immigration
law? Logically, they should be. In Banks’s hypothetical, Gerardo’s $10 bag of
marijuana led to deportation. If minor drug offenses cease to count as
aggravated felonies for deportation, we would at least be one step closer to
proportional deportation.
CONCLUSION
Many of the questions briefly explored here are beyond the scope of what
Banks set out to do in her article. This Essay is thus not in the nature of a
traditional criticism, but instead points out ways in which Banks’s article
inspires further practical implications and alternative frameworks. Legal
scholarship is at its best when it identifies and describes a significant problem
and proposes workable solutions. It is even better when, as here, an article
invites reflection on a wider range of policy concerns and provides the
historical context necessary to tackle them.

21 Richard Branson, War on Drugs a Trillion-Dollar Failure, CNN.COM (Dec. 7, 2012, 6:05 PM), http://
www.cnn.com/2012/12/06/opinion/branson-end-war-on-drugs/.
22 See Jim Galloway, A New Governor Looks Behind Georgia’s Prison Bars to Save Money, AJC.COM
(Jan. 15, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://blogs.ajc.com/political-insider-jim-galloway/2011/01/15/a-new-governorlooks-behind-georgias-prison-bars-to-save-money/.
23 See Reihan Salam, Chris Christie and the “Failed War on Drugs,” REUTERS.COM (Jan. 24, 2014),
http://blogs.reuters.com/reihan-salam/2014/01/24/chris-christie-and-the-failed-war-on-drugs/.

